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Repressive toleration: 1 the Huguenots in 
early eighteenth-century Dublin 
Ruth Whelan 
According to the historian Philippe Joutard, French Protestants have longer 
memories than any other religious group - he obviously has no experience of the 
religious cultures of Ireland, where, as Oliver MacDonagh observes, the past is 
always contemporary. 2 To illustrate his point, Joutard quotes a story from an 
article which appeared in National Geographic in 1978, written by the American 
writer, Carolyn Patterson, who retraced the journey of Robert Louis Stevenson 
through the Cevennes, a historic stronghold of French Protestantism. When 
Patterson came down from Mont Lozere, she was invited to a meal in the garden 
of a local woman whose property commanded a splendid view of the mountain. 
Gesturing towards the Lozere, her hostess's opening gambit was 'Battlegrounds 
in the war'.l She was not referring to the French Resistance in World War II, but 
to the Camisards, the name for the Protestants who met the enforced 
Catholicism of Louis xrv's reign with armed resistance in the early eighteenth-
century. Obviously, French Protestants have long memories, and the stories they 
remember serve to construct and give expression to their identity, or identities, 
as a religious minority in France. 
The identity of all communities is grounded, among other things, in remem-
bering and retelling founding events, that is, events which set them apart as a 
specific group to begin with. For example, the Reformation, the St Bartholomew 
massacre (1572), the Edict of Nantes (1598), and the Revocation of the Edict of 
Nantes (r685) spring to mind as typical founding events for French Protes-
tantism. That is to say, each of these events is a watershed - as Yves Bizeul notes 
- marking a clear distinction between 'before' and 'after', and giving rise to new 
1 I have borrowed this term from H. Marcuse, 'Repressive tolerance', in R.P. Wolff, B. Moore, 
H. Marcuse, A critique of pure tolerance (Boswn, 1969), pp. 8r-123. However, I use it descrip-
tively to denote a situation where wlerance is proclaimed but applied in such a way as also to 
oppress those who are deemed to be the objects of toleration. I do not wish to imply any agree-
ment with Marcuse's views. For a consideration of rhese, see A. Callinicos, 'Repressive tolera-
tion revisited: Mill, Marcuse, Macintyre', in J. Horton and S. Mendus (ed.), Aspects of 
toleration, philosophical studies (London and New York, 1985), pp. 53-74. 2 See P. Joutard, 
'Le Musee du Desert. La minoritc nfformee', in Nora (ed.), iii, p. 532; 0. MacDonagh, States 
of mind: a study of Anglo-Irish conflict I780-1980 (London, 1983), pp. I , 6-7, 9· 3 C.B. 
Patterson, 'Travels with a donkey 100 years later', National Geographic, 154/4 (1978), m-6r; 
Joutard, p. 533· R.L. Stevenson noted a similar attachment ro the past, Travels with a donkey 
in the Cevennes (London, 1991. rst ed. 1879), pp. 109-26. 
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forms of iden city. 4 But while the importance of these events, and other later ones, 
to the construction of the identities of French Protestants is recognised, sociolo-
gists and historians insist that they are not all of equal importance. In fact, 
through the complex processes of remembering and retelling, the Revocation of 
the Edict of Nantes has become the founding event of the French Reformed 
tradition, eclipsing all others, even the Reformation.\ Why is this the case? More 
!han any other event in their history, the Revocation lends itself to the construc-
tion of a myth of origins capable of sustaining the struggle for survival as a 
distinctive minority. I want to dwell on this for a moment. 
As the story in National Geographic suggests, focussing on tb.e Revocation and 
its aftermath allows French Protestants to construct an 'identity-in-opposition', 
to borrow a term used by Alan Falconer to describe the formation of Irish iden-
tities.6 French Protestants have expressed their identity over against the other in 
a variety of ways, some of which are strikingly similar to Irish cultural attitudes. 
For example, in the early modern period, their intellectual leaders developed a 
theology of the faithful remnant struggling against the monolithic Roman 
Catholicism of France. And, more recently, they have presented the history of 
Protestantism in more general terms as the political struggle of a minority over 
against an oppressive hegemonic culture.? Resistance, then, is one of the key 
aspects of this identity-in-opposition, and the revolt of the Camisards is but one 
episode in a long litany of refusal to conform to the dominant religion or culture. 
Another key aspect of their identity-in-opposition emerges as a consequence of 
this resistance. Their community is nurtured by a sense that it is descended from 
martyrs and victims who were prepared to pay the ultimate price for their differ-
ence. This found expression in the past as a 'victim-theology' (to use another of 
Alan Falconer's concepts), which presented the French Reformed community as 
a_church 'under the cross', and identified it with the crucified Christ.8 And in our 
own time the attachment to a past of heroic martyrdom is kept alive by the 
Musee du Desert, the principal museum of French Protestantism (whose collec-
tions commemorate the persecutions of the Revocation era), where a very well 
attended commemorative ceremony is held every autumn. However, in the final 
analysis, French Protestants do not see themselves as victims but as survivors, 
because they identifY with those who fled abroad, or went underground to 
preserve the integrity of their religious beliefs, and rarely, if ever, with those who 
conformed to Roman Catholicism. In other words, the Revocation is the perfect 
founding event because to remember it is to engage in a performative action that 
4 Y. Bizeul, L'identite protestante, pp. 29-30; see Joutard, p. 556. 5 See Jourard, p. 544, and 
Bizeul, p. 74· 6 A. Falconer, 'Remembering', in A.D. Falconer and J. Liechry (ed.), Recon-
ciling memories (Dublin, 1998), p.13. 7 For a fine example of this liberal French Protestant 
historiography, see E. Labrousse, 'Une fo i, tme loi, tm roi?' La Revocation de !Edit de Nantes 
(Paris, 1985), and for its place in rwemierh-cemury French Protestamism, see Bizeul, pp. 50, 
84-5. 8 Falconer, p. 13; on the victim christology of the Huguenots, see R. Whelan, 'Les 
Christ de Jacques Abbadie', in M.-C. Pirassi (ed.), Le Christ entre orthodoxie et Lumieres 
(Geneve, 1994), pp. 139- 6z. 
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The Huguenots in early eighteenth-century Dublin r8I 
transforms minority status into a kind of nobility, grounded on hard choices.9 So, 
while the Revocation founds the tragic story of a persecuted community, it ~an 
also be interpreted as an epic of heroic overcoming. 10 
As we mighr expecr, hisrorians of French Protestantism entertain, either 
wittingly or unwittingly, a somewhat ambivalent attitude to this mythic story of 
origins. For no matter how objective they strive to be, they cannot escape entirely 
from the place they themselves occupy in history, or from the origin myths which 
have formed their own identities. Inevitably, then, they end up both 
demythologising and remyrhologising at least some of these origin myths. For 
example, some historians explode the notion of the 'faithful remnant' by demon-
strating that, at least in the sixteenth century, French Protestants also aspired to 
political and religious dominance." Others insist that far from being innocent 
victims of oppression, the Protestants were not slow to resort to violence in 
pursuit of their goals. According to this view, French Protestants did not simply 
resist oppression, they also engaged in it.'" This theme of resistance has been revis-
ited by historians of the Revocation era who have conclusively demonstrated that 
far from being a community whose story is mainly one of heroic overcoming, the 
vast majority ofHuguenors, on the contrary, conformed ro Carholicism.'l Obvi-
ously, then, these critical appraisals serve to highlight neglected aspects of the 
history of French Protestantism, and to foster more objective interpretations. But 
this is not the whole story. 
Even the most objective Protestant historians of the French Reformed tra-
dition tend to use an epic style when considering the oppression meted out to 
their fellow believers at the time of the Revocation.'• Epic modes appropriately 
render the horror of past events that must not be forgotten, facilitating their 
transmission through the generations, as Paul Ricoeur has argued.'5 But they also 
structure the past as story, give it a meaning,'6 and thereby feed into the con-
struction of origin myths. Although an epic style is not usually used when writing 
about the intellectual history of the Huguenots, interpretations are voiced which 
imply a teleology of history and place the Huguenots in the vanguard of progress. 
Thus, historians often argue, broadly speaking, that there was a shift from obscu-
rantism to Enlightenment in the mentalites of the Huguenots at the end of the 
9 P. Connerton, How societies remember (Cambridge, 1989); and Bizeul, pp. 44-7- 10 I am 
influenced here by the notion of a 'poetics of history', developed by H. White, Metahistory, the 
historical imagination in nineteenth-century Europe (Baltimore and London, 1973), pp. 8-9. 
11 The militarism of the Huguenots was an issue for French Protestant historiography from 
the early modern period, see R. Whelan, 'Images de Ia Reforme chez Pierre Bayle ou l'hisroire 
d'une deception', Revue de theologie et de philosophie (Lausanne) 122 (1990), 85- 107; for a rwen-
tieth-century assessment, see, E.G. Leonard, Histoire generate du protestantisme (Paris, 1988. 3 
val. 2nd edition), ii, pp. 94-96; for the views of English-speaking historians, see Holt, pp. 
173- 89; Knecht, pp. 55-60; Salmon, pp. 183-93. 12 See, for example,]. Garrisson, L'Edit de 
Nantes et sa Revocation. Histoire d'une intolerance (Paris, 1985) , p. 71. 13 Labrousse, 
pp. 202- 6. 14 Bizeul, p. 81. 15 Ricoeur, Temps et 1'ecit, iii, p. 342. 16 White, pp. 1-42. 
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seventeenth centuryP According to this view, French Protestants began to move 
away from intolerance, confessional preoccupations and dynastic attitudes, and 
to embrace instead the defence of toleration, the rights of the individual con-
science, and the social contract as the basis of political power. And this view is 
right, up to a point. The attitudes of many Huguenots did develop in response 
to their changing social, religious, and political circumstances, but not as a whole, 
and not unequivocally. By generalising from individual instances, or highlight-
ing some tendencies "nd not others. histori :m~ :Jre helping to construct a myth 
of origins that links French Protestantism, at least indirectly, to liberty, 
Enlightenment, and modernity.'8 Of course, this implicitly places the develop-
ment of Huguenot mentalittfs within the framework of an epic of heroic over-
coming- in this case - of intolerance, oppression, and obscurantism. 
) There is an Irish version of this myth, linking the French Protestant immi-)_ grants to the dawn of modernity in our own country that I have had the oppor-
\ tunity to consider on other occasions.'9 This is the argument that the experience 
of being 'victims of persecution in their native country' led certain Huguenots, 
in early eighteenth-century Ireland, to challenge the politics Qf exclusion directed 
against Dissenters and Roman Catholics. 20 I myself have argued this in the past, 
although far more cagily than is usual. Arguments for toleration are certainly 
made by French refugee writers in Ireland. But, I pointed out, they are made 
within a worldview shaped by polarities between 'popery' and Protestantism, 
superstition and truth - not to mention a strong sense of election - which cer-
tainly colour their understanding of toleration in the Irish context. I was, 
however, roundly criticised for apparently seeking to explain away their 'liberal' 
views by appealing to 'hidden agendas'.ll But, as I now believe, my earlier 
interpretation was not nearly cagey enough, because both my critic and I were 
operating out of the origin myth that places the Huguenots on the side of 
progress. Intolerance and Penal legislation were indeed questioned by certain 
members of the Irish Huguenot Diaspora, but not unequivocally, as I hope to 
show. In fact, the terms and concepts used by some were not harbingers of mod-
ernity, but rather remained firmly rooted in the social consciousness of the ancien 
regime. To demonstrate this, I shall analyze in derail the two sermons on the 
subject of toleration preached in the 1720s by Gaspar Caillard, the minister of 
the French Reformed Church in Peter Street, and published in Dublin in 1728; 
17 It is possible that the French language lends itself particularly to this kind of pithy saying, 
implying a teleology that may not always be intended. See for example the following tide, 
which I myself had a hand in devising, M . Magdelaine, M.C. Pitassi, R. Whelan, A. McKenna 
(ed.), De l'lmmanisme aux Lumieres, Bayle et !e protestantisme (Paris and Oxford, 1996). 18 
Bizeul, pp. 84-5. 19 R. Whelan, 'Persecution and toleration: the changing identities of 
Ireland's Huguenot refugees', HSP 2.7/r (1998), 20-35. 20 J.-P. Pinion, 'The question of 
religious conformiry and non-conformiry in the Irish Refuge', in Caldicott, Gough, Pinion 
(ed.), p. 2.92, and the editors conclusion, p. 424. 21 See C.E.J. Caldicott, 'On short-term 
and long-term memory', and my reply, 'Remembering with integrity', HSP 27!2 (1999), 
179-80, and 281- 3. 
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The Huguenots in early eighteenth-century Dublin 
a second edidon appeared in Amsterdam ten years later."' Quire apart from their 
subject matter, there are a number of reasons why these rwo sermons, and to a 
lesser extent the other sermons in the collection, are worthy of attention . 
In early modern society, when newspapers were still in their infancy, and lit-
eracy was not widespread, oral communication, whether sacred or profane, had 
an importance which it later lost to the primed word. As Bernard Roussel has 
observed of sixteenth-century Geneva, teaching elders, that is, ministers, created 
and manipulated opinion, and inculcated convictions and precepts through 
repeated oratorical interaction with the faithful. 2J Preachers occupied an import-
.;mt place in a nerwork of communication because the views they expressed in 
sermons reached a wide cross-section. of society, and exposed at least the most 
.attentive to the possibility of being influenced by what they heard. Unfortunately, 
there is no way of measuring that influence, but we may still study the printed 
sermon as the surviving record of an intellectual and social space where a religious 
identity is being elaborated. A further qualification is necessary, however, before 
we proceed. Unless sermons also survive in manuscript form, it is impossible to 
determine whether the printed version is a faithful record of the homily as it was 
preached and heard. Since there are, to my knowledge no extant manuscript 
sermons written by Caillard, we cannot be sure that the printed text expresses 
views that were developed in the hearing of rhe church-going public. The first 
edition of Caillard's Sermons sur divers textes de I'Ecriture sainte was published in 
Dublin, however. Two aspects of that edition suggest that even if the oral and 
printed text were different, the sermons succeeded in touching some chord that 
we may hope to reconstruct, at least to some extent, by studying them. 
The first edition of Caillard's sermons carries a list of 168 subscribers that has 
been studied by Maire Kennedy. 24 According to her findings , 150 of the 
subscribers have French names, which is a much higher proportion than on the 
extant lists for subsequent Huguenot publications in Dublin. The list in 
Caillard's volume includes the names of some prominent refugees who reached 
the upper levels of Dublin Corporation life,25 and Huguenot army officers who 
represent nearly 30o/o of the total. 26 There is also a scattering of Trinity College 
Fellows and Church of Ireland clergy, most notably Francis Hutcheson. 
22 G. Caillard, Sermons sur divers textes de l'Ecriture sainte (Dublin, ]. Smith and W Bruce, 
1728; Amsterdam, Henri du Sauzet, 1738); see M . Germaine, Peter Street Cemetery. Non-con-
formist French Huguenot Church and cemetery, 'French Peters; Dublin, I7II-I879 ([Dublin, 
1999]. 23 B. Roussel, 'Predication et hisroire des religions', BSHPF 134 (1988), p. 663. 24 
M . Kennedy, 'Huguenot Book Buyers in Dublin before 1750', in R. Whelan, P. Coffey, V. 
Costello, P. Ewles-Bergeron, J. Hill, M. Kennedy, J. McKee,]. Powell, R. Vigne, 'Report of 
the Round Table: the current state of research on the Huguenots and Ireland, held at the 
National University ofireland, Maynooth, 17 May 1999', HSP27f3 (woo) pp. 419-21. 25 I 
owe this information to my colleague Dr J. Hill of the Department of History, NUI 
Maynooth, who has written a definitive study of Dublin political life in the eighteenth century, 
From patriots to unionists. Dublin civic politics and Irish Protestant patriotism, I66o- I840 
(Oxford, 1997). 26 Kennedy, p. 421. 
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Subscription lists are commonplace and do not indicate that the author's views 
were either read or shared by those who subscribed to the publication. But, as 
Maire Kennedy notes, these lists are not random since the subscribers tended to 
be linked in one or more ways, and their finapcial contribution indicates 'a level 
of support for an author's work and where .. that support was concentrated'! ? If 
we remember that Gaspar Caillard arrived in Ireland from Holland only in the 
latter half of 1720, the list poinrs ro a high degree of social assimilation ro Protes-
tant circles in Ireland, and possibly also to their ideology, as I hope to show. The 
second aspect of the Dublin and Amsterdam editions worthy of comment is the 
certificate of approval, issued by a group of French clergy in the Irish Diaspora, 
which is mentioned at the beginning of the volume. The approbation certifies 
the orthodoxy ofCaillard's sermons, declaring that they contain nothing contrary 
to Scripture. Again, this does not prove that any individual member of the French 
clergy in Ireland shared his views. Nonetheless, certificates of orthodoxy do not 
merely protect, they also express, a pre-existent ideological consensus. It is at least 
possible, then, that the views developed in the two sermons on toleration were 
shared, to some degree at least, by the clerical elite in the Irish Diaspora, and by 
those whom they influenced. 
On first reading, Caillard's sermons seem to lend themselves to the view that 
the Huguenots contributed unequivocally to the development of modernity, 
because there is a striking congruence between the ideas promoted in his first 
s.ermon and the arguments for toleration developed in the continental French 
Enlightenment. There are three main arguments in both instances: the argument 
from prudence, the argument from rationality, and the argument from moral-
ity. 28 Like many another thinker in the early modern period, Caillard expresses 
the prudential argument negatively. He asserts that the consequences of intoler-
ance are worse than the consequences of toleration, because intolerance results in 
the breakdown of society. In his view, once the legitimacy of enforcing a set of 
beliefs is accepted, 'that would put an end to civil peace and the security of all 
human beings. Citizens would have to arm themselves against fellow citizens who 
differ from them in religion'. '9 Toleration, in this argument, is a requirement of 
prudence, it is needed to preserve public order. However, the prudential argu-
ment is unsatisfactory in as much as it makes intolerance merely imprudent and 
reduces toleration to political expedience, but it fails to explain why intolerance 
is wrong. Jo And Caillard is clearly concerned to prove that intolerance is more 
than a question of inexpediency by arguing that it is also irrational. 
Again Caillard develops his argument - that toleration is a requirement of 
rationality - negatively. In fact, he establishes the irrationality of intolerance by 
27 Kennedy, p. 420. 28 S. Mendus and D . Edwards (ed.), On toleration (Oxford, 1987), p. 
3; J. de Viguerie. 'La rolerance a I' ere des Lumieres', in La tolerance (Paris, 1986), pp. 43-55. 
29 G. Caillard, 'Sermon comre l'imolerance', Sermons, i, pp. r8. 30 I am drawing here on 
Mendus and Edwards (ed.), p. 5; and P.P. Nicholson, 'Toleration as a moral ideal', in Horton 
and Mendus (ed.), Aspects of toleration, p. 164. 
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The Huguenots in early eighteenth-century Dublin 
arguing that coercive means are unfitted to religious ends. He does this, in the 
first place, by asserting that questions of belief are decided by the individual con-
science, which he presents as a separate, interior sphere, answerable to God 
alone.l1 Caillard is a rationalist, which is a commonplace position among C 
Huguenots of his generation. He holds that people are converted and brought ro 
an understanding of the rrurh of the Gospel by acts of persuasion and instruc-
tion that present clear and convincing evidence and proofs to their minds and 
thereby sway their consciences or 'hearts'. Such acts are the vehicles of divine 
grace, which 'accompanies' them, but does nor overrule themY This under-
standing of conscience and belief prepares the ground for a second and related 
argument, which Caillard shares with Locke, namely that there is a causal gap 
between coercion and belief.B Caillard does not question the efficacy of coercive 
means, on the contrary. He acknowledges that coercion can induce people ro 
accept anything, even the very opposite of what they hold to be true.J4 What he 
does dispute is the efficacy of coercion in bringing about the desired effect, that 
is, in making individuals change their minds, and accept as true what they pre-
viously held to be false. In fact, he argues that religious belief is immune to coer-
cion, since belief results from inner persuasion not brute force: 'no power on 
earth can stop me from believing what appears true to me'.l5 Thus, coercion is 
inefficient, which implies that it is irrational to use ir w induce belief, or bring 
about religious conformity. fu Caillard expresses it: 'you are sinning against the 
most evident principles of reason'. 36 
The arguments from prudence and even rationality (or irrationality) are 
instrumental and pragmatic; they do not establish a positive case for toleration 
as an intrinsic or moral goodY Caillard is concerned to ground toleration in 
ethics, however, and he does this, as we have come to expect, by a partly nega-
tive argument: that intolerance is intrinsically bad. If coercion can change 
people's behaviour, but not their beliefs, as he has demonstrated, then, he main-
tains, imposing penalties on dissidents will only end up filling the churches with 
hypocrites. Intolerance breeds 'lies and imposture, which are vices God abhors 
above all things', and brings about the damnation, rather than the salvation of its 
victims.l8 So, in his view, oppressing people to make them change their minds 
brings about a morally abhorrent situation, which can only indicate that enforced 
conformity is wrong. Bur he also presents toleration positively, as morally right, 
by grounding it on a principle of respect of persons.l9 In a passage that is worth 
quoting for its defence of individualism, Caillard expresses the view that humans 
are essentially autonomous, self-determining beings. 
31 Caillard, i, pp. 16, 17· 32 Caillard, i, pp. IO, 12-14, 32, 56. 33 I am applying to 
Caillard's views terminology developed by]. Horton and S. Mendus (ed .),john Locke, 'A Letter 
concerning toleration; in focus (London and New York, 1991), p. 103. 34 Caillard, i, p. 17. 35 
Caillard, i, p. 17. 36 See Horton and Mendus. (ed.), john Locke, pp. 7, and 104; 
Caillard, i, p.17. 37 I am influenced here by Susan Mendus (ed.), justifYing toleration, con-
ceptual and historical perspectives (Cambridge, 1988), Introduction, pp. 1-19; and by 
Nicholson, pp. 158-73. 38 Caillard, i, pp. 24-5. 39 On this, seeN. Denr, 'Rousseau and 
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Everyone feels and everyone agrees that individuals should be allowed to 
see with their own eyes and to make their own choices in things that 
concern them alone and nobody else whatsoever. Pursuing the kind of life 
that I consider suits me the best is undoubtedly my responsibility. Nobody 
thinks he has the right to inflict a penalty on me if I chose one profession 
rather than another. I am free to dispose of what is mine, without people 
getting the idea that they can interfere with my plans. Is it only in religion, 
then, that I am to give up my freedom in order to follow blindly the whim 
and will of others?4° 
The question is rhetorical, of course. Caillard seems to place an absolute value 
on the human right to self-determination; he maintains that, in matters of con-
science, such a right is bounded by God alone. Earthly powers must therefore 
respect a person's right to self-determination whether in life choices or religious 
preferences.41 Toleration is construed here, as Susan Mendus suggests more gener-
ally in the case of arguments from autonomy, as 'something that may be claimed 
as an entitlement, since it is this alone which displays due and proper respect for 
persons in all their diversity'Y For Caillard, then, toleration is a requirement of 
morality, a position which is further reinforced by his statement that it is also 
congruent with the Gospel: 'the Gospel exudes only gentleness, forbearance, and 
toleration'.+J At this point in the sermon, toleration is no longer merely an instru-
mental good, it is also a moral and religious ideal. 
These are stirring views to find expression in eighteenth-century Dublin, and 
Caillard was not alone in expressing them, as we shall see. The only limitation 
on toleration, mentioned in this first sermon, is the concept of harm, and it is a 
common enough limitation in what might be broadly defined as the liberal 
tradition.44lt is, of course, a problematic concept, but I shall return to that later. 
Suffice it to say, for the moment, that Caillard argues for a society where actions, 
practices and beliefs, which are not harmful, should be tolerated. He was not the 
first to make this kind of argument. In fact, the biblical text he chose for his 
sermon, Luke 14.23 (one of the final verses to the parable of the wedding banquet, 
containing the much abused phrase 'compel them to come in') points to an inter-
textuality with an earlier defence of toleration. Pierre Bayle's Commentaire 
philosophique, which focussed on the same biblical verse, is a passionate denun-
ciation of intolerance, written and published in the aftermath of the Revoca-
tion.45 The recent experience of the persecution of the Huguenots inspired Bayle 
respect for others', in Mendus (ed.), pp. II5-35· 40 Caillard, i, p. 15. 41 Caillard, i, p. r6. 
42 Mendus (ed.), p. 5· 43 Caillard, i, p. 25. 44 Caillard, i, p. 27; J. Horton, 'Toleration, 
morality and harm', in Horton and Mendus (ed.), Aspects oftoleration, pp- II3-35- 45 P. Bayle, 
Commentaire philosophique sur ces paroles de jesus-Christ 'Contraim-les d 'entrer; ozl l'on prouve 
par plusieurs raisons demonstratives qu'il ny a rien de plus abominable que de faire des conversions 
par Ia contrainte, et l'apologie que S. Augustin a faite des persecutions (r686). A modern edition 
of the first two parts of this seminal work was published recently, De Ia tolerance, commentaire 
philosophique, ed. J.M. Gros (Paris, 1992), see rhe Introduction, pp. 7-41. 
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The Huguenots in early eighteenth-century Dublin 
w forego the kinds of limitations that Locke imposed on toleration in his Epis-
tola. 46 In fact, Bayle argues for a general toleration. He wanted to extend rights 
of equal coexistence not only to Roman Catholics and atheists - two categories 
of people excluded by Locke - but also to Jews and Muslims, who were the 
despised other of early modern Europe, and w any other dissenters from the pre-
vailing orthodoxyY So, both the conceptual framework of Caillard's views, and 
the intertextuality with Bayle- which would not have been lost on an eighteenth-
century public - do indeed appear to place the Dublin minister in the vanguard 
of what is often called the early Enlightenment. 
Bur this interpretation is only possible if we neglect w take account of the 
immediate socio-political context that gave rise to Caillard's sermon in the first 
place. A marginal note indicates that he preached on the subject of toleration to 
mark a particular ceremonial occasion: the Peter Street congregation had met on 
5 November 1723, as had many Dublin Protestants, to commemorate the Gun-
powder Plot.48 It is common knowledge that the Gunpowder Plot was mounted 
in 1605 by a group of Roman Catholics, in an attempt to bring down the govern-
ment of king James I; thirty-six barrels of gunpowder were hidden in the base-
ment of the House of Lords in London, and were to be set off by the Catholic 
adventurer, Guy Fawkes. T he plot was discovered on the 4 November, and the 
conspirators were arrested, tortured, and executed. It became the custom in 
Protestant cathedrals and churches throughout Britain to mark God's miraculous 
deliverance of church and state with an annual commemoration on 5 November. 
The Irish Parliament enacted commemoration of the Gunpowder Plot after the 
Restoration, in r666; by the r69os those who participated in the ritual were exclu-
sively Protestant, and, by 1704, exclusively Anglican, we are told:~[Like so many 
of the ceremonial commemorations in the ritual calendar of Protestantism in the 
early modern period, remembering the Gunpowder Plot was one of the many 
ways in which Protestants kept grievances alive that helped to mark out their own 
identity over against that of others. 5° Indeed, 'the generality of Protestants pre-
ferred [ ... ] to celebrate what separated them from their Catholic neighbours and 
tenants', as Toby Barnard has remarkedY It is tempting, w imagine that Caillard, 
recently arrived from the Continent, entered the pulpit, intent on challenging a 
political and religious consensus that defined itself by anti-popery. Tempting, but 
narve. 
In reality, Caillard reminds the Peter Street congregation at intervals through-
out the sermon that the intolerance he is denouncing is that of the Roman 
46 J. Locke, A letter concerning toleration, in Horton and Mend us (ed.), john Locke, PP- 45-7; 
S.L. Jenkinson, 'Two concepts of tolerance: or why Bayle is nor Locke', journal of political phil-
osophy 4 (1996), pp. 302-21. 47 Bayle, Commentaire philosophique, pp. 271-82. 48 Cail-
lard, i, p. 28. 49 Cressy, pp. 141- 2; see also, T.C. Barnard, 'The uses of 23 October r64r and 
Irish Protestant celebrations', EHR 106 (1991), p. 914; J. Kelly, '"The glorious and immortal 
memory": commemoration and Protestant identity in Ireland 166o- 18oo', Proceedings of the 
Royal irish Academy 94C (1994) , 25-52. 50 I am influenced here by M. Santer, 'The recon-
ciliation of memories', in Falconer and Liechty (ed.), p. 31. 51 Barnard, p. 919-
r88 Ruth Whelan 
Catholic Church. He invokes the Inquisition, the use of .fire and sword, and the 
treatment of heretics as proof of the violence used by Catholics to propagate their 
religious viewsY The Reformed tradition, in his view, provides a stark contrast 
to this intolerance, since it is a communion characterised by gentleness, charity, 
and toleration.5J The polarity expressed here marks this sermon out as an exercise 
in Protestant mythologising, which, far from challenging the status quo, is deter-
mined to reinforce it.54 This is all the more obvious when a second instance of 
intertextuality present in the sermon is noted. Caillard quotes from a sermon 
preached by John Tillotson before the English House of Commons to mark the 
Gunpowder Plot on 5 November 1678, a sermon that is driven by anti-Catholic 
sentiments, which Caillard obviously shares.55 For he collapses the founding 
events and ritual grievances of the immigrant community, the Huguenots, into 
those of its hosts, the Protestant political nation. In summing up, he alludes to 
both the St Bartholomew Massacre, and the Gunpowder Plot, urging the 
congregation to keep these memories alive as active reminders of the dangers of 
Roman Catholicism. Indeed, he closes with a pair of rhetorical questions that 
would inevitably revitalise in the minds of the congregation the demonising of 
Catholicism as the barbarous other: 
And as for you, my brothers, have you not witnessed or been subjected 
yourselves to the furious excesses of popish cruelty? Do you need anything 
else to inspire you with righteous horror towards such an anti-Christian 
church and its barbarous spirit, which it conceals under the guise of zeal?56 
Caillard is harnessing the Huguenots' recent experience of persecution to the 
annual commemoration of the Gunpowder Plot. Both sets of memories, which 
belong to disparate origin myths, are combined by him to create a shared con-
sciousness, wherein 'popery' appears as the embodiment of evil and serves to 
unite immigrant and host in a political culture de.fined by its anti-Catholicism. 
There is, however, a porentially unstable relationship berween Caillard's views 
on toleration, and his incorporation of the historic grievances of immigrant and 
host into an identity defined by opposition to Catholicism. Because, despite the 
pointed anti-Catholic thrust of his sermon, the views he expresses seem to call 
for general toleration based on the principle, among others, of respect of persons. 
Irish Catholics and Dissenters might be forgiven, then, for interpreting Caillard's 
52 Caillard, i, pp. 2, 3, I). 53 Caillard, i, p. 29. 54 See R.D. Tumbleson, Catholicism in 
the English Protestant imagination. Nationalism, religion, and literature (Cambridge, 1998), 
pp. II , 12, 13. Although the Irish context is rather different, many of the observations con-
cerning ami-Catholicism are applicable ro attitudes prevalent in Ireland in this period. 55 
The quote is in Caillard, i, p. 21, and is adduced to prove the barbarous and cruel spirit of 
Roman Catholicism. Caillard is quoting from Jean Barbeyrac's translation of the sermons: ]. 
Tillotson, Sermons sur diverses matieres importantes (Amsterdam, 1716- 22. 5 vol.); 'Sermon xix. 
'De l'incompatibilite d'un zele cruel et vindicatif, avec !'esprit et le but de I'Evangile. Lc 
ix.55-6', iii, pp. 1-32. 56 Caillard, i, p. 29. 
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The Huguenots in early eighteenth-century Dublin 
sermon, had they heard or read it, as paving the way for them to lay claim to tol-
eration as an entitlement that was congruenr with morality and rationality, not 
to mention prudence. These apparent implications of his views may have given 
rise to negative comment and even unease within the community of Huguenot 
immigranrs because he preached a second sermon, some time later,57 in order to 
establish the limits of toleration. He was concerned that he might be interpreted 
as recommending 'an unconstrained relativism' ,s8 or as he expresses it at the 
beginning of the sermon, 'that our argument against intolerance had the poten-
tial to promote religious indifference, thereby sowing confusion in church and 
state' ,59 So, in this second sermon, Caillard simultaneously defends both his 
earlier concept of toleration and the necessiry of imposing civil restrictions on 
atheists, Roman Catholics, and other dissenting minorities. The task was not an 
easy one. He could not appear to confer a retrospective legitimacy either on the 
civil penalties imposed on the French Protestants or on the Revocation of the 
Edict of Nantes. Consequently, in this second sermon, he attempts to tease out 
the problematical relationship between the state, the church, and the individual 
consCience. 
He accepts as self-evident the notion that each state is a sovereign entiry, pro-
claiming that all peoples have the right to found communities and adopt the 
form of government best suited to their needs. A state, so founded, has the right 
to promulgate its own laws, and the purpose of these laws, in his view, is twofold. 
They must first and foremost promote 'the interests of the glory of God' and, 'the 
interests of religion', 6o and not merely safeguard the temporal advantages of the 
community. But, of course, such laws as are passed must also guarantee the 
securiry, peace and happiness of 'the corporate body, and in so far as possible, 
every individual member'. 61 The qualification is important, as we shall see, since 
it enables Caillard to place significant limitations, in the name of the sovereign 
community, on the individual's right to self-determination in confessional 
matters (for which he had argued in the first sermon). For the moment, however, 
he designates the religion, which the laws are designed to promote, as 'religion 
in general',6" presumably indicating those common beliefs - for example, in the 
existence of God, or in retributive divine justice - that many thought necessary 
to social stabiliry and the public good. 63 Such an understanding places constraints 
both on rulers and on subjects. 
Since the sovereign power always has a duty to rule in order to promote the 
glory of God above all else, laws may not be passed that contravene divine law 
which, Caillard believes, is revealed not only in Scripture, but also in natural law 
and to the individual conscience. 64 The actions of the sovereign power and the 
57 The second sermon, also on Luke 14.23, is nor dared, bur opens with the remark that Cail-
lard preached a sermon on this text 'some rime ago, now'. 58 I borrow this phrase from M. 
Walzer, On toleration (New Haven and London, 1997), p. 5· 59 Caillard, i, p. 33. 6o Cail-
lard, i, p. 38. 61 Caillard, i, pp. 34-6. 62 Caillard, i, pp. 40, 42. 63 See Jenkinson, p. 
306. 64 Caillard, i, p. 37· 
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positive law are, therefore, in his view, to be judged against this higher law and 
the principles of natural justice it enshrines. It follows that while the people are 
obliged to obey the sovereign power and the positive laws, their obedience must 
never require them to act against the higher law, which takes precedence over all 
others. In fact, Caillard reiterates his view that people can never be constrained 
by law either to believe the opposite of what their consciences tell them is true, 
or to relinquish their freedom to embrace religious difference. 65 As a matter of 
principle, however, he again places one important limitation on religious 
freedom: 'provided only that there is nothing in such religious diversity that 
would tend to destroy religion in general or harm the social body as a whole' . 66 
This prohibition of anything harmful to the sovereign state, as Caillard has 
defined it, sits uneasily with his defence of the human right to self-determination, 
and of conscience as a separate sphere, which he has again marked out here as 
areas of life where the state cannot intervene. In the divided society of early 
modern Ireland, or in divided societies in general, can there be a neutral 
definition of what is harmful? And if not, can the concept of harm provide a reli-
able criterion for establishing what should or should not be tolerated?67 If it 
cannot, should it be disregarded or resisted as an infringement of the right to self-
determination? It is interesting to note that such questions do not arise in 
Caillard's sermon. Nor does he say what the individual or community may do if 
the civil magistrate attempts to prescribe in matters of conscience or against the 
principles of the higher law. He simply denounces the injustice of any such 
measures: 'a law that seeks to deprive individuals of the privilege of following the 
light and prompting of their consciences is unjust, and contrary to the law of 
God'.68 There are reasons, as we shall see, for his reticence. 
From religion in general, and the obligations it imposes on ruler and ruled 
alike, Caillard moves to the relationship between church and state, which he 
defines in Erastian terms. He accepts the early modern notion of cuius regio eius 
religio, investing sovereigns with the power to designate the form of belief they 
think 'purest and best' as rhe official religion, and enshrine it in a national 
church. 69 He also makes them responsible for the oversight of ecclesiastical 
affairs, granting them the right to create educational establishments to form the 
young and to train the professors, teachers, and ministers necessary to run the 
churches, schools and colleges. He authorises them to intervene where necessary 
to ensure that the clergy are fulfilling their duties, to deprive them of their func-
tions if they are not, and to convoke a general assembly of the church to settle 
matters peaceably if doctrinal disagreements arise.7° Surprisingly, Caillard also 
65 Caillard, i, p. 40. 66 Caillard, i, p. 40. 67 I am influenced here by Horton, 'Tolera-
tion, morality and harm', p. n6, 132. 68 Caillard, i, p. 40. 69 Caillard, i, pp. 46, 42. The 
notion that the religion of the sovereign should also be the religion of the people (cuius regia 
eius religio) was widely accepted in post-Reformation Europe. Caillard uses the notion of the 
rights of the erring conscience, popularised by Bayle, to defend the right of sovereigns to des-
ignate their own belief system as the official religion, even if that belief system is false. They 
are answerable for their beliefs, he argues, only to God. 70 Caillard, i, pp. 44-6. 
I 
/" 
gc 
ch 
to 
pi: 
ne 
ab 
on 
if 
he 
wl 
ou 
se( 
ho 
Be 
po 
diJ 
na 
iti< 
lS I 
thl 
na1 
wr· 
to 
thr 
str: 
tol 
po 
on. 
Ro 
pn 
try 
be( 
reb 
Ca 
for-
cor 
vie 
tiOJ 
71 
lard 
48-
an c. 
er law and 
people are 
;ence must 
1cc over all 
Jnstrained 
:m is true, 
matter of 
religious 
~rsity that 
L whole'. 66 
,il!ard has 
mination, 
llt here as 
r of early 
a neutral 
ide a reli-
:d?67 If it 
ht to self-
anse In 
nay do if 
;ainst the 
my such 
·Wing the 
Le law of 
nd ruled 
V"hich he 
regio eius 
:lief they 
national 
:siastical 
orm the 
run the 
ecessary 
:ir func-
to settle 
ud also 
, 'Tolera-
, 42. The 
'lius regia 
m of the 
.s ro des-
se. They 
The Huguenots in early eighteenth-century Dublin 191 
grants sovereigns the right to bestow prerogatives on members of the national 
church -while denying them to 'others', that is, dissenters - and empowers them 
to proceed against 'false religions' in order ro protect the 'true religion' .7' He does 
place four restrictions on this last power, however, insisting that sovereigns may 
neither impose corporal punishment on dissenters for their beliefs, nor civil dis-
abilities to bring about their conversion to the established church. With one eye 
on the Edict of Nantes, he also maintains that legal penalties may not be applied 
if they violate the terms of any formal treaty previously passed into law. Finally, 
he invokes the concept of harm once again to limit the use of penalties to cases 
where individuals or groups are a danger to the state.72 Such restrictions are obvi-
ously designed to try to accommodate the rights and obligations of both the 
secular power and the individual conscience. But it is nonetheless difficult to see 
how Caillard's position differs from that of Gallican Catholics, like Richelieu and 
Bossuet, who also believed that the submission of church and clergy to the secular 
power was essential to the processes of orderly governmentJJ In fact, his position 
differs frbm theirs only in the unstated assumption that the sovereign and the 
national religion are Protestant. 
So ml!lch becomes clear when Caillard reflects on the implications of his pos-
ition for those he designates as 'heretics' , 'false religionists', or the 'erring' _74 He 
is concerned to outline what action, if any, should be taken by the state against 
three categories of people, as he defines them, who are not members of the 
national church. The first are those whose religion or beliefs authorise crime and 
wrongdoing; the second, those who hold certain principles that could contribute 
to the 'destruction of government'; and the third, 'heretics' whose errors pose no 
threat to society. Caillard believes that while sovereigns have a duty to apply the 
strictest penalties to people who fall into the first two categories they must extend 
toleration to those in the third .?> The detail of the argument reveals just how 
potentially intolerant this makes the state. Caillard's first category embraces not 
only thieves and brigands, but also blasphemers and atheists, and his second, 
Roman Catholics. While blasphemers and atheists may hold heterodox views in 
private, Caillard's belief that religion is vital to the public good means that if they 
try to spread those views they are endangering the stability of the state and 
become subject to the penalties of the law.76 As for the Catholics, Caillard 
rehashes the anti-papist commonplaces of the day. He reminds his public that 
Catholics are a potential fifth column within the state whose allegiance to a 
foreign power makes them refuse to take oaths of fidelity and inspires in them a 
commitment to overturn the government when the opportunity arises .n In his 
view, then, Roman Catholicism does not 'exactly fall within the case for tolera-
tion'/8 but, if already established in a country, it must be allowed to continue to 
71 Caillard, i, pp. 46, 42. 72 Caillard, i, pp. 52-3 . 73 See Jenkinson, p. 306. 74 Cail-
lard, i, pp. 47, 51, 56. 75 Caillard, i, pp. 48-9. 76 Caillard, i, p. 50. 77 Caillard, i, pp . 
48-9, 51; see also C.D.A. Leighton. Catholicism in a Protestant kingdom: a study of the Irish 
ancien regime (London, 1994), p. 102. 78 Caillard, i, p. 51. 
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exist, albeit subject to restrictions. The 'heretics' (dissenters from national ortho-
doxy) in Caillard's third category are - surprisingly - also subject to restrictions, 
which are designed to limit their expansion and restrict their access to public 
office.79 What this means, of course, is that while dissenters, Catholics and athe-
ists enjoy freedom of conscience they do not enjoy equal rights of coexistence or 
self-expression with believers affiliated to the national church. They are tolerated 
in the negative sense of being exempted from conformity, but not in the positive 
sense of being granted an equal right to self-determination. 
It must by now be patently obvious that the apparently 'progressive' or 
'modern' elements in Caillard's defence of toleration are so encrusted in 
limitations as to deprive them of any real power to persuade his public to embrace 
an idea of toleration as a basic human right. But was that the purpose of the 
sermons in the first place? It is not just the ceremonial occasion on which he 
preached, but also the very contents of the sermons that indicate another concern 
altogether. To put it succinctly, he appears to be delineating the nature of toler-~ arion within a single-faith society, where the single faith is Protestantism, and 
1- where those who dissent from it may be exempted from conformity on grounds 
of conscience.8° Furthermore, his outline of the single-faith society so resembles 
the religious hierarchy and divisions of eighteenth-century Ireland as to be indis-
tinguishable from them. It is legitimate to argue, then, that Caillard not only 
accepts the ideology of the confessional state,81 but also promotes both it and the 
restrictions it brought to bear on those who did not belong to the national 
church, whether atheist, Catholic or Dissenter. While other commentators may 
take exception to this interpretation,82 it is, in my opinion, the only one that fits 
the evidence considered as a whole, rather than as a series of propositions extrap-
olated from their social and historical context. That is not to say; however, that 
Caillard's defence and promotion of the status quo in Ireland does not give pause 
for thought. On the contrary, the problematical category of harm had been 
invoked in the would-be single-faith society of Gallican France to justifY the 
restrictions imposed on the Huguenots, who were also perceived as a danger to 
national security. 83 Why, it may be asked, did Caillard accept and defend the 
appropriateness of the confessional state when he belonged to a community who 
had been so recently victimised by a similar ideology? And why did he receive 
such support from prominent members of that community, among whom were 
first-generation refugees who had lost everything in their flight from France? 
; The answer to these questions brings us closer to understanding the political 
' and religious consciousness of the Huguenots in early eighteenth-century 
( Ireland. Their acceptance of the ideology of the confessional state was the resulr 
of their socialisation not by the Revocation only, but also, and perhaps even more 
79 Caillard, i. pp. 52-3. So I am influenced here by Jenkinson, p. 303. 81 On this, see 
Leighron, pp. 7-18. 82 See Caldicott, 'On short-term and long-term memory', p. 280. 83 
B. Dompnier, Le venin de l'heresie. Image du protestantisme et combat catholiqtte au XV!le siecle 
(Paris, 1985) , pp. 62- 5, 82-7. 
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The Huguenots in early eighteenth-century Dublin 193 
importantly..- by the regime of the Edict of Nantes. The Edict brought open con-
fessional conflict to an end without, however, altering either the mentality of the 
religious majoriry or the character of France's major institutions, which remained 
committed to uniformity. It was also an act of royal absolutism that bound the 
minority to the good pleasure of the king, on whom they depended for survival 
as a distinct minority. In fact, the Edict institutionalised the confessional state, 
made religious dissent a matter of sufferance, and guaranteed that political and 
social respectability were tied to membership of the dominant religion.84 Unable 
to conform to the religious orthodoxy of their country, the Huguenots experi-
enced a conflict of identity that they sought to resolve by developing an exag-
gerated loyalty to the Crown. But their protestations and acts of loyalty could 
never make up for their religious particularism, which became increasingly 'un-
French' under the absolutist monarchy of Louis XIV. 85 However, when they 
removed to Ireland, this conflict berween religious and political identity could be 
resolved, at least at one level. 
After the Glorious Revolution, the Huguenots were in the happier position 
of sharing the king's religion, although admittedly their Reformed tradition 
made them in some respects unacceptable to the Anglican minority in Ireland. 
Nonetheless, the part they had played in the Williamite campaign meant that 
their commitment to the Protestant imerest was unquestionable. In a very 
important way, then, coming to Ireland enabled the Huguenots to resolve the 
conflict berween political loyalty and religious particularism that they had 
experienced in France. It did this by giving them access to the hierarchy and 
distribution of privilege which, in both their native France and their adopted 
homeland, was tied to confessional affiliation. When they settled in Ireland, the 
Huguenots who conformed to the established church were able to trade up their 
minority status by transforming it into membership of the social elite.86 Those 
who, like Caillard, did not conform (preferring their own Reformed uadition 
to the alien rites of Anglicanism),87 seem to have adopted, nonetheless, the con-
fessional ideology of their hosts, and to have observed religiously its political 
liturgies of commemoration. These ceremonies, which were obviously not con-
fined to Anglicans, 'were based on and gave expression to, a mythic and patri-
otic sense of national identity' and helped to form and disseminate 'a distinctly 
Protestant culture', as David Cressy has argued.88 So, while the non-conforming 
84 My interpretation of the Edict of Names as an institutionalisation of intolerance is similar 
to that of the editors of the following volume and the authors of many of the essays within it, 
see Grandjean and Roussel (ed.), Coexisterdans !'intolerance. 85 The sense rhar rheir religious 
belief was being interpreted as an essentially 'un-French' attitude explains, I believe, the insist-
ence that Protestants are, in fact, 'bons Fran~ais' in the pamphlet warfare surrounding the 
Revocation, see, for example, P. Jurieu, La politique du clerge de France (rst ed. r68r) (LaHaye, 
r682), pp. 8, 126, r58; see also rhe essay by 0. Miller in rhis volume. 86 I am influenced here 
by Leighton, p. 92. 87 On this, seeR. Whelan, 'Sanctified by the Word: the Huguenots and 
Anglican Lirurgy', inK. Herlihy (ed.), Propagating the word of Irish Dissent, r65o-r8oo (Dublin 
and Portland, 1998), pp. 74-94. 88 Cressy, pp. xi, xii. 
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Huguenots may have been excluded from the structures of preferment associ-
ated with the national church, they were included in its ideological framework 
and social network, as the list of subscribers to Caillard's sermons indicates. If 
they failed to question the ideology of the confessional state and its hierarchy of 
privilege, it was, then, because their own newly acquired acceptance within that 
social order depended on the exclusion of the Catholic majority. But they also 
failed to question it because, quite simply, they believed in it. They brought with 
them to Ireland a fear of Catholicism that had been revitalised by their recent 
experiences and was reinforced by the anti-papist attitudes of the times. Sur-
rounded by a majority population whom they did not understand, whether cul-
turally or linguistically, and whom they profoundly distrusted (with notable 
individual exceptions), they invested their hopes of survival, as a once perse-
cuted minority, in the politics of exclusion that guaranteed their existence as a 
social elite. 89 
One final question remains. Is Caillard arguing in bad faith when he seem-
ingly defends the absolute right to self-determination in one sermon, only to 
restrict it severely in a second? It is possible to answer this question only by sit-
uating his views in the wider social context of his time. Arguments for tolera-
tion were not unusual in early eighteenth-century Dublin. For example, on 23 
October 1725, bishop Edward Synge, the younger, preached a sermon on tol-
eration, based on the text 'compelle intrare' from Luke's Gospel, before the 
members of the House of Commons to commemorate the r64r rebellion.9o His 
views are surprisingly similar to those advanced by Caillard two years earlier. 
He is critical of restrictions on freedom of conscience and freedom of worship 
while at the same time accepting the legitimacy of certain civil restrictions 
designed to preserve the security of the state.9' And, like Caillard, he invokes 
the category of harm to justifY the application of these restrictions to Roman 
Catholics, whose 'doctrines [ ... ] are really dangerous to all, bur especially ro 
Protestant governments' .9' The ami-popery shared by the two preachers reveals 
the problematical nature of the category of harm, which does not enable people 
to discriminate between moral (or political) danger and mere prejudice.93 And 
their use of this category resolutely situates their conception of toleration, for 
all its apparently 'modern' resonances, within the early modern ideological and 
social paradigm of the confessional state.94 Caillard was not arguing in bad 
faith. The ideological consensus between his views, those of Galli can Catholics, 
and the positions elaborated by prominent Irish Protestants indicates that he 
was using the concepts and terms present not only in Ireland, but also in all 
89 See Leighron, p. 47· 90 E. Synge, The case of toleration consider'd with respect both to 
religion and civil government (Dublin, 1725). 91 See M.-L. Legg ~), The Synge letters. 
Bishop Edward Synge to his daughter Alicia, Roscommon to Dublin, I746-I752 (Dublin, 1996), 
pp. xi.:..xiii; see Barnard, pp. 902-3, and Leighton, pp. 98-102. 92 Synge, p. 41. 93 See 
Horton, Toleration, moraliry and harm', p. II4. 94 I am drawing here on Jenkinson, PP· 
318-19. 
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ancien regime societies in early modern Europe. 95 The critique of those con-
cepts, and the hierarchy of privilege and exclusion they enabled, came later in 
the century, but it was Bayle, not Caillard, who contributed to the rational 
scrutiny we associate with the Enlightenment. The views of the Huguenot who 
preached in Dublin ro commemorate the Gunpowder Plot on 5 November 1723 
were too equivocal, too potentially illiberal and too rooted in the confessional 
ideology of his time to bring about the paradigm shift that marks the emer-
gence of modernity. 
We should not leave Caillard's sermons, however, without reflecting briefly on 
their wider implications for commemoration and identity, both then and now. In 
early modern Ireland, calendrical commemoration of landmark dates, such as the 
Gunpowder Plot, clearly function as lieux de memoirewhere a distinctively Protes-
tant consciousness was elaborated and disseminated.96 For Huguenot refugees, like 
Caillard, these occasions also function as laboratories of memory where they work 
out who they have become both in the light of what they had been and in the new 
context of exile. Their new identity is a complex fusion of volatile and not always 
compatible elements. The St Bartholomew Massacre and the Revocation do func-
tion as dangerous memories motivating a critique of what the refugees thought of 
as 'popery', but they do not actually stimulate a generalised critique of repressive 
or discriminatory regimes. They do not do so because the refugees were obviously 
comfortable with rites of commemoration that served to include them in a Protes-
tant in-group by defining others as an out-group who had to be excluded because 
they were seen as a threat to state (or in-group) security. Their easy adoption of 
these rites of exclusion expresses a consciousness shaped and inspired not just by 
the dangerous memories of their history but also by the social hierarchy and 
religious politics of the regime of the Edict of Nantes with its negative under-
standing and repressive practice of toleration. This more complex understanding 
of the forces that helped to mould the mentalites of the Huguenot refugees chal-
lenges the exclusive insistence of twentieth-century French Protestants on the 
importance of the Revocation for their group identity. As I hope I have shown, 
commemorating other contested landmark dates, such as the Edict of Nantes, 
enables us to recover at least something of the richer contours of history, memory 
and identity. 
95 The application of the concept ancien regime to Ireland is not uncontroversial; it does, 
however, provide a way of understanding the ideological consensus between Huguenot immi-
grants and their Protestant hosts in Ireland. I am, of course, influenced by Leighton's cogent 
development of chis notion in the context of eighteenth-century Ireland. 96 For the concept 
of lieux de memo ire, see chapter I above, pp. 24-5. 
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